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Abstract
Social Media has allowed activists to make their causes visible and network locally and transnationally with supporters, but posed equal threats to activists, as authoritarian states employ repressive surveillance measures. This paper explores the struggle between the state and activists for visibility on
social media platforms, and conceptualises the paradoxes of visibility in daily practices in both sides.
This is done by researching grassroots human rights groups from the Egyptian revolution, and therefore contributing to the narrative that social media has presented as many challenges as opportunities
to activism, because the same tools that are used to leverage activism are also used strategically by
the state to suppress activism.
Keywords: Visibility, paradoxes, activism, surveillance, Egyptian revolution, Arab Spring
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1. Introduction
As much as information and communication technologies (ICTs) enable activism, which can eventually result in enhancing democracy (Hier & Greenberg, 2009), by allowing social movements to reach
out to, and engage with, wider networks for mobilisation and attention (Tufekci, 2013), ICTs also enable repressive surveillance and monitoring practices for regimes, which pose a threat to activists (Hier
& Greenberg, 2009; della Porta, 2013; Hosein & Nyst, 2013). Surveillance is defined as “a policing
tactic which aims to quell or weaken political activity” (Starr et al., 2011, p.73), in order to gather information about social movements, and inhibit them from accomplishing their plans (Starr et al.,
2011).
In Egypt, protests erupted against longstanding dictatorship since 2011, in what became known as the
Arab Spring. It is claimed that social media has played an essential role in the Egyptian revolution,
where the numbers of social media users on different platforms have increased dramatically during
that period (Harindranath et al., 2015). For example, there were 4.1M users on Facebook in 2010, and
in 2013 the number has reached 13.5M users (Harindranath et al., 2015). But the role of technology in
the revolution has not necessarily been positive, since activists have had longstanding evidence that
shows the government is monitoring people in many ways, which were made possible through the collaboration of the police with the telecommunication corporations, and through acquisition of surveillance software (Raoof, 2014). As a result, activists have been arrested in 2008 after their call and SMS
data has been collected from telecommunication companies (Hosein & Nyst, 2013). When the Egyptian revolution erupted in 2011, authorities also arrested Wael Ghonim; the administrator of the famous Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said”, which operated anonymously then and campaigned
against police brutality and was considered one of the major online platforms in organising the protests (BBC, 2011). Egyptian authorities continued to crackdown on administrators of opposition Facebook pages (Michael, 2014). Journalists, bloggers and other citizens have also been arrested or referred to investigation over their views on social media (Amnesty International, 2014; Michael, 2014;
Sakr, 2016). This state surveillance and monitoring is considered an issue beyond the violation of privacy of individuals, as it is more of a fundamental result of political power (Stalder, 2002).
Despite all this, social media has often been praised in the literature about the Arab Spring and social
movements, where it has been considered the main enabler of the revolution, and the media created a
hype about a “Facebook revolution” (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011), and a “liberation technology”
(Chenoweth, 2016). However, social media is not a neutral tool (Lim, 2012), and the context is often
overlooked when technology is championed in the Arab Spring, which is considered “a gold rush for
the surveillance industry - used to crack down on protesters” (Bahrain Human Rights, 2017, no pagination). The Egyptian government even intensifies its crackdown further by even blocking some social
media platforms (Hamama, 2017).
Therefore, the same tools that are used to leverage activism, network and spread online posts and news
virally can also present considerable challenges to activists; a topic which has been understudied in the
literature, in comparison to opportunities presented by these tools. Therefore, it is integral to study
how social media spaces are transformed into an arena of power interplay between activists and the
state, where activists are leveraging these tools to help their causes, while dictators are using the same
tools to impose control. In a sense, technology has been paradoxical, which means that “a certain
technology applied in a certain way in a certain context may have consequences or implications of one
kind, and may necessarily and at once be implicated in a contrary set of consequences or implications”
(Arnold, 2003, p.231-232). The paradox concept is therefore used to analyse tensions and challenges
(Zheng et al., 2011) in the context of technological tools that present the two conflicting sides, activists and the state, with different opportunities that have opposite consequences.
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While abundance of research documents surveillance by authoritarian regimes, little has been done to
research activists’ daily practices and how they handle being monitored. This paper discusses how
there is a constant interplay of power on social media between activists and the state. Even though activists have no choice but media tools to surpass temporal and spatial boundaries (Thompson, 2005) by
increasing the information flow from activists to the world, and therefore make regimes’ violations
visible, these same tools are exactly what threaten the physical and mental wellbeing of activists, because of the imbalance of power to the favour of the state, that not only has advanced surveillance
means, but also employs means of media propaganda online.
This paper examines the paradoxical effect of visibility in activism, namely, perceiving visibility as a
double-edged sword with contradictory effects (Uldam, 2016; 2017). The perspective of paradoxes
allows us to reveal the “tensions, oppositions, and contradictions” (Poole & Van De Ven, 1989, p.562)
in the strategies and consequences of visibility and invisibility employed by both activists and the state
in the Egyptian revolution and its aftermath, which then contributes to further understanding of the
activism dynamics in the Arab Spring. This research aims to show that ICTs have helped suppress activists, who feel they are becoming more visible to the public, while the more powerful state maneuvers this visibility to its favour by using the techniques analysed here, resulting in visibility tension
between both activists and the state. It also contributes to our understanding of how activism is hindered by the state and how such practices are performed, and how activism and state control are in
constant interplay in online platforms, such that digital activism does not constantly yield results in
favour of activist groups. This is particularly important in the context of the Arab Spring, where social
media is championed to be the enabler of social change, while in fact, social media afforded different
mechanisms of control for the state, to disempower activists, in the same way activists were empowered by the same tools.
The paper will proceed with a literature review, methodology and background information on the
groups interviewed in this research, then the analysis presents the paradoxes that exist in visibility between the state and activists, and finally a discussion and conclusion.

2. Literature Review
This section first reviews the concept of visibility and how it is part of Foucault’s broader concept of
the governmentality of populations, then expands to review surveillant visibility in specific; a key
concept to this paper.

2.1

Governmentality and Visibility

In 1978-79 Foucault outlined the concept of governmentality as part of his interest in power, where it
is no longer centralised but strategically dispersed in societies. It is an expression of disciplinary power that goes beyond institutions of prison, hospital and asylum in his previous writings (McKinlay &
Pezet, 2017). Since governmentality is a broad theory, we will draw upon the concepts that are in the
scope of this article.
Government here is a power technique that refers to how people’s conduct can be guided in a specific
way. It assumes that those who are governed will adjust or resist the governing measures (Lazzarato,
2009; McKinlay & Pezet, 2017). Those who govern attempt to decide the conduct of the governed,
and those who are governed will develop counter measures to bypass or diminish being governed, or
to be governed differently, or otherwise become self-governed (Lazzarato, 2009).
Foucault labels the strategies to resist as “counter-conducts” (Lazzarato, 2009, p.114), whilst at the
same time, governmentality leaves no space for collective action (McKinlay & Pezet, 2017). “Gov-
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ernmentalist strategies develop credible ways to define, monitor and assess a population so that specific types of individuals can be targeted for intervention” (McKinlay & Pezet, 2017, p.4). Brighenti
(2010) argues that there is an aspect of visibility in how governmentality is performed, while visibility
has been limitedly mentioned in the analysis of governmentality, as Foucault himself only addresses
visibility by expressing that close monitoring of subjects acts as a form of discipline (Tazzioli & Walters, 2016). Foucault did not consider the counter uses of visibility by subjects, even though he argued
that exercising power always faces resistance from subjects (Tazzioli & Walters, 2016).
Morevoer, Tazzioli and Walters (2016) argue that visibility in governmentality is not merely about
putting subjects under surveillance, but rather gaining knowledge about them, so that they can be governed. They further suggest considering visibility as a critical area of struggle and not just a technique
of discipline, as Foucault did, because if visibility can be considered as “practices of knowledge”
(p.448) that expose certain subjects while concealing others, then it can therefore be argued that visibility can also be used by the subjects in a reversible way. Therefore, visibility should not be perceived
only as a practice of unidirectional surveillance, but as a complex system, where many practices of
visibility contradict and oppose each other (Tazzioli & Walters, 2016).
To theorise visibility, Brighenti (2010) broadly describes it in three types: recognition, control and
spectacle. The visibility of recognition is related to social representation, and how people are recognised in the society. In this model, visibility grants power and emancipation to populations, like minorities for example, so groups of people strive to be noticed and affirmed.
Visibility of control is the opposite premise of the visibility of recognition, as the former is concerned
with how authorities perform control in secrecy. Foucault (1977) has conceptualised visibility of control in disciplinary societies through the Panopticon model, where more visibility means less power for
prison inmates, who do not seek to be visible but are forced to. Inmates’ awareness of being constantly
visible determines their submission for discipline, which affects their behaviour. In modern days, visibility of control is practiced through surveillance technologies.
The third type is the visibility of the spectacle; where objects and characters are advertised as a means
of “discipline, control and standardisation of the masses” (Brighenti, 2010, p. 49). This type of visibility determines what events are made visible, and what not, to give populations certain feelings about
those events. It is a media type of visibility, where certain people and actions are made visible, receive
attention, and given certain media narratives (Tazzioli & Walters, 2016).
In order to analyse power and visibility, it is useful to examine the interactions between these types of
visibility, instead of analysing each individual type (Tazzioli & Walters, 2016), which is what this paper aims to do. This is because if visibility can be considered a complex field with different practices
around exposing or concealing knowledge, then the three modes of visibility from Brighenti (2010) do
not necessarily explain all the dynamics, interactions and tensions around visibility, especially with
regards to activism, where there is constant top-down and bottom-up resistance between authoritarian
states and activists.

2.2

Surveillant Visibility

In the context of social movements, the cyberspace has manifested itself into a powerful surveillance
arena; it is “the ultimate tool for repression and the nightmare of totalitarian societies in which not only everything is watched and recorded but any action considered out of the normal is a reason for investigation” (Jordan, 1999, p.199-200). Surveillance is broadly about obtaining and analysing information about targeted subjects (Brighenti, 2010), and Lyon (2002) conceptualises surveillance as a
way of making subjects’ identities and conduct visible, which turns visibility into a social and political
concern.
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Surveillance establishes asymmetries of visibility, meaning that certain actors like the state can employ surveillance means for citizens without the state being seen, and therefore making subjects feel
suspected, so they become self-disciplined (Brighenti, 2010). The exercisers of power can therefore
control subjects using surveillance, instead of direct force (Uldam, 2017). There is also another asymmetry between those who recognise that the monitoring apparatus exists, and those who do not
(Brighenti, 2010), because details about what exactly is being watched and why are hidden, which
spreads uncertainty among subjects (Uldam, 2017).
In the context of activism, when activists are aware or scared of surveillance, social movements may
be forced to exert effort to defend themselves, and are, therefore, possibly driven away from their
main objectives (Starr et al., 2011). Activists may also respond to surveillance by employing more
individual undercover forms of resistance, instead of a more apparent collective action (Starr et al.,
2011). States can also use their financial resources to increase their visibility, and therefore, gain more
advantages over the civil society that lacks such resources and funds (Fuchs et al., 2012). This way,
visibility acts as empowering and disempowering citizens at the same time. For example, social media
empowers actors with the ability to be seen by the public because platforms are easily accessed and
widely available to use. On the other hand, the asymmetrical way social media visibility operates enables governments to monitor online activity without users knowing (Uldam, 2017).
However, surveillance is not only about watching, but also tracking people and information related to
them (Brighenti, 2010). It is no longer centred with the government but distributed in the society.
Haggerty and Ericson (2000) suggest that Foucault’s conceptualisation does not take into consideration modern surveillance technologies, which force us to revisit the Panopticon analogy. Therefore,
they suggest the idea of a networked “surveillant assemblage”, which departs from the Panopticon’s
central top down visibility, towards a more complex pervasive system, where there is an assemblage
of objects, people, knowledge, institutions and processes functioning together. Haggerty and Ericson
(2000) further argue that by understanding surveillance in the form of assemblages, we are able to see
the rise of surveillance as “multiple, unstable and lacks discernible boundaries or responsible governmental departments” (p.609), since this assemblage cannot be tackled by blocking certain technologies
or by condemning a certain institution; surveillance is more dispersed and multi-directional. Understanding surveillance in that manner helps us analyse how actors develop different strategies of visibility (Brighenti, 2010).
The other reason why the Panopticon model is unsuitable for modern day analysis of power and visibility is that it completely overlooks the role of technology that visibilises those who exercise power to
the public, as opposed to the Panopticon that visibilises the public to those in power; and therefore,
political leaders are now exposed to the public (Thompson, 2005). The power of technological development also lies in the ability of rendering events or actions visible by recording and transmitting
them, which makes people able to surpass spatial and temporal settings by being able to witness events
that take place at different places and times (Thompson, 2005).
Therefore, surveillance operates in a world of information flows (Castells, 1996; Thompson, 2005),
where there is a struggle for the visibility of content, as different individuals strive to make themselves
seen, or to expose others (Thompson, 2005). Nevertheless, visibility is not only a way of highlighting
different social and political aspects of life, as it has become more of an arena in which “social and
political struggles are articulated and carried out” (Thompson, 2005, p.49).
This research therefore follows the argument by Uldam (2016, 2017), that social media visibility is
potentially challenging, rather than merely empowering, for activism. She has researched corporate
monitoring of activists and presented the struggle between corporates and activists for visibility, ana-
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lysing this through two of Brighenti’s concepts of visibility: the visibility of recognition, manifested in
the empowering potential of social media to activists, versus the visibility of control, manifested in the
disempowering potential of corporates’ surveillance to activists. Nevertheless, this paper will expand
on the paradoxes of all three types of visibility defined by Brighenti (2010), conceptualising it as tensions between two opposite parties; paradoxes in an arena of constant interplay of power, and asymmetrical visibility.

3. Methodology
The protests in Egypt witnessed a lot of violence, so protesters were arrested and faced trials, or injured and sometimes killed. This has given rise to different human rights groups from the grassroots to
campaign for victims and provide them with support, and promote their activism to be acknowledged
widely in and outside Egypt. These groups used Facebook groups or online mailing lists to organise
their activities and relied on no funding or any formal structure in terms of leadership and spokespersons. This research focuses on 8 groups working in a wide range of activities. Two groups operated in
in both Cairo and Alexandria have been counted as four because activism was organised with different
dynamics in each of them. Table 1 offers an anonymous summary of the groups’ scope of work. All
groups operated in Egypt starting from 2011, when the revolution started, and afterwards, except
Group5, which formed in 2008, then revived immensely as violations intensified in 2011. Researching
these groups gives insights on daily practices of activists rather than the overall social media dynamics
about the Arab Spring, which has been widely researched.
Members of these groups acknowledge that most, if not all, of these groups’ communication, task delegation and scheduling is carried out via social media platforms. The online space has made it possible
for these groups to be founded, and online communication is the most important method to share latest
news and updates among members, and those who are offline for any reason (like wanting to take a
break off social media, or unable to financially buy a smart phone) were not regularly updated with
their group’s activities and plans.
Group

Cause

Date Founded

1

Crowdsourcing medical supplies to field hospitals in places of protests, as protesters were injured.

2011

2

Providing legal assistance for people unjustly trialed and detained, operating in
Cairo.
Activity includes: publishing video and text testimonials from detainees’ families, connecting them with volunteer lawyers, and conducting media interviews,
among other campaigning efforts.

2011

3

A branch of Group 2, operating in Alexandria.

2011

4

Rescuing and assisting victims of sexual assaults during protests in Cairo, in
order to empower women to protest.

2012

5

Lawyers based in Cairo, providing legal assistance to protesters if they are arrested

2008

6

Same as Group 5, but based in Alexandria.

2013
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7

Advocating for and providing assistance to political prisoners and their families.

2013

8

Refugees support group in Alexandria: providing subsistence and legal assistance if they are detained.

2014

Table 1: Summary of Groups in this Research
The selection of groups relied on the immense impact created by these groups, as well as the publicity
they received internationally, yet, the dynamics of these groups were not researched in-depth, and media or research articles often considered these groups as part of the wider protest activity in Egypt.
Nevertheless, being informed by observations of the online groups’ public social media channels since
2011, there were frequent details that sparked interest around how these groups’ members face violations for their activism through being arrested and facing trials, and also sometimes their reduced activities at times of greater crackdown. Therefore, to understand members’ interpretation of events,
semi-structured interviews have been done with them: 17 interviewees were females, and 13 were
males, and many volunteered in more than one group. 26 interviews were done face-to-face and 4
were done via Skype. Appendix A summarizes the Interviewees’ affiliations and interviews’ durations.
The selection of members to be interviewed was based on having people with a variety of roles, experiences, and activity levels. For example, some interviewees were more active than others, and some
were prominent activists since before the revolution, while others were less experienced. Their roles in
their groups varied, sometimes based on their professions, as some were lawyers, media professionals,
or something else.
Interviews’ length ranged from 43 minutes to 2 hours, and had an average of 1 hour 19 minutes. They
were conducted in Arabic, or English, if chosen by the interviewees. Files were encrypted and the text
was transcribed and translated to English. Analysis was done thematically, using abductive coding on
NVivo 11, to produce a list of hierarchical nodes around surveillance at first. After iterating between
the literature and the data, the relevant data was recoded and arranged under the visibility concepts.
The 3 clear-cut types of visibility did not cover the rich material and examples set out by interviewees,
which led to the emerging results in the following discussion.

4. Visibility Paradoxes
The richness of data obtained from the fieldwork in Egypt shows that visibility practices and dynamics
cannot be simply classified as either recognition, control or spectacle, and that it is essential to problematise visibility deeper. This paper reinterprets and enriches Brighenti’s visibility types under three
paradoxes, to capture the rising tension between two parties who resist and fight each other’s
knowledge, existence and practices, through visibility, in the light of the case of activism in Egypt.
The first two paradoxes uncover the tensions between the three types, in the way visibility is manifested in the movements, and in the response to these movements and counter movements. The final paradox is an internal tension among activists that arises as a consequence of the visibility of control.

4.1

Visibility as Empowerment versus Vulnerability

For activism, writing public posts online or making public appearances is needed to make the public
recognise campaigns, and call for action for causes. For example, writing live tweets in Egypt is an
important way of reporting from any protest or event. When prominent activists adopt certain causes,
these causes are automatically promoted in the eyes of the public, who trust the prominent figures of
activism. Therefore, being public is important for activists to give credibility to the news they share,
and gain the public’s trust, as well as transfer online news transnationally to the world.
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It can therefore be considered that social media has made human rights groups visible to, and empowered, different parties, under Brighenti’s visibility of recognition concept. First, the groups in this research were made visible to people who wanted to help with the groups’ work. These volunteers were
empowered to participate in a social movement when the founders reached out to the public. For example, one of these groups was formed because the founder tweeted asking people if anyone is interested to help, they can gather in a certain place at a certain time. Second, the groups were made visible
to victims and their families, who needed support, and were empowered by reaching out to groups, via
social media or the groups’ hotlines. Third, the groups made a massive impact through social media
such that they became visible to traditional media, which eventually made the groups visible to a wider audience of the population who are not necessarily using social media. A group’s founder mentioned that if it hadn’t been for social media, “we wouldn’t have been able to appear on TV, people
wouldn’t have hosted us or felt forced to host us so that we could talk about the cause”. Therefore,
social media enabled groups to enforce a narrative of human rights on traditional media, which resulted in making the state’s violations visible to the people, and eventually disempowering it. Fourth, social media has made the groups visible to transnational activists and organisations. Through translation
and dissemination of information online in written and video forms, the global community has recognised the violations, and many activists were awarded prestigious human rights awards, and hosted in
events worldwide, which eventually empowered activists once targeted by the state.
The techniques that the groups used to make themselves visible were many. They published victims’
testimonials, empowering them by making their stories reach a wider audience, and maintained official accounts on at least Facebook, Twitter, and sometimes YouTube. They used branding and marketing techniques for their causes (Poell et al., 2016), and specially designed catchy logos that were used
as profile and cover photos on social media, as well as printed as stickers that activists, and those who
sympathise with the cause, used as a symbol of making the cause visible, such that those who do not
know about it ask and become more aware. Moreover, some activists seek being individually visible
by asking their groups’ Facebook pages’ administrators to identify them by name on social media, that
X or Y are the lawyers following up on a specific human rights case, and that they belong to these
groups. Therefore, activists sometimes like have their work visible, recognised and promoted, and take
pride in being part of their groups.
However, many other activists choose to hide their identities and activities, in order to protect themselves from being vulnerable to the state if all group members are identified. This is because as activists’ recognition increases, the state’s persecution to them also increases. A group administrator said
that “there is the worry of being spied on, or the admins being found out and then [arrested], there has
been a lot of worry about this recently…because the group has been targeted and people even appeared on TV attacking us. So there is that worry that they find out who the admins are, and that we
end up being more directly in the line of fire… We are thinking that we need to use more secure
means, that we don’t enter the group’s page directly from any of our private profiles, that we use [a
tool] that prevents anyone from pinpointing our location. We currently don’t open [the group’s Facebook page] inbox at all.”
There is a significant risk that activists face, because the state keeps a close eye on what is published
online, and therefore, has persecuted many activists over what they posted on social media. As a result, many activists had law suits because of Facebook posts, while others were demanded to remove
Facebook posts they had written about human rights victims. Another example was when an activist
posted about a case over Facebook and went into a police station to try to enquire about the detainees,
he was told by the officer that they saw what the activist had just written on Facebook. One interviewee said about her group “I think the main issue [that technology introduced] was being constantly
aware of security breaches and that the person in charge of the page or responsible for any vital role
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sacrifices or risks their personal life... At some point those working on vital issues in the group were at
risk of legal persecution, and they were the ones with admin access to the group.”
Therefore, the same social dynamics that grant visibility to groups and victims, also make activists
vulnerable, as their freedom of speech and expression, and safety are directly limited by the state. As
this persecution increases, activists also try to gain more visibility in order to gain solidarity nationally
and transnationally, which can protect them in case they are arrested or imprisoned. This way, visibility of activists presents an obstacle to the state once a prominent figure is imprisoned. The state also
imposes control through direct force, which eventually instills fear in activists. In one incident, security forces created control by confiscating an activist’s laptops and arresting him from his home, and
immediately, a group that was logged on from his computer was hacked, leaving all administrators
with no control over their group’s public Facebook page.
It is evident that surveillance, through the Panopticon effect over activists, was not the only means to
hinder activism in Egypt. The Panopticon concept alone was not enough to show authoritarian state
control over online platforms, because control over activists’ visibility extended to dangerous risks
like imprisonment. There is a constant power struggle that takes place through social media between
activists and the state, where the state wants activists to know that all actions are monitored, while activists, who have the feeling that the state knows everything, also want to be empowered, so they work
on gaining more visibility to promote causes and raise solidarity.

4.2

Visibility as Discourse versus Counter-Discourse

Authoritarian regimes use social media as a tool to balance the power of dissent and provide a counter
argument to activists’. For example, the Egyptian regime systematically hijacked the comments on We
Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, in order to create counterpropaganda to the protests in the early
days of the Egyptian revolution (Poell et al., 2016).
Moreover, according to Abdelsaboor (2014), statistics have shown that Egypt has one of the highest
number of fake social media accounts worldwide. These accounts are used for hacking purposes and
increasing number of fans for certain pages. During the Arab Spring, these accounts have spread and
have been called the Electronic Committees, and aim to influence or deceive the public’s opinions.
These committees are formed by recruiting people to form a counter online movement that works in a
systematic way to affect the public and fool them into believing in a certain discourse, or also to confuse opposition groups. These committees mainly seek mobilising people towards an idea or a person,
and defaming opposition figures, by spreading false news or rumours about people and organisations.
Such committees have spread for two reasons; first, the absence of professional media outlets that
people can believe since the state controls all information and news on traditional media outlets, and
second because people have found a new free outlet for exchanging unbiased news on social media,
which did not exist before. The effect of propaganda produced by these electronic committees has
been considerable, and opposition movements also must confront them if they want to spread their
ideas as well. Because of their organization and training, these committees have become more of an
industry that helps the regime and its supporters (Abbas, 2014).
Groups in the scope of this research also experienced the existence of pro-regime electronic committees who struggle to be visible by posting social media content in a systematic way, showing their
support for the state. In their interviews, activists were unsure whether these accounts are fake, bots or
real users. There were images leaked off a closed Facebook group that contains an organised proregime group of people, who were agreeing about the posts they need to publish to support the state
and argue against activists. There is limited information on whether these groups are doing this as a
paid work or voluntarily, but indeed the president once mentioned in one of his talks that he can now
“create a story in Egypt through one or more of these social networks’ battalions” (ON Ent, 2016), in a
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context where he warned his audience not to rely on information on social media, mentioning that this
could be dangerous.
On the other hand, groups in the scope of this research have been creative and widely acknowledged
for their use of social media, allowing for “unanticipated forms of visibility” (Trottier & Lyon, 2012,
p.93). One of the visibility techniques groups in this research used to counter the regime’s propaganda
was creating an online protest, where they invited users via a Facebook event to continuously write
comments, during a certain time the group specified, about violations on all social media pages run by
the state. This has afforded the group visibility when street protests were not an option at all, and the
first time this idea was implemented, it went viral and attracted attention from international media for
the thousands of comments posted by users to flood the official state Facebook pages. It showed how
visibility can be used to bypass crackdown, and therefore provide a way to present violations as a
spectacle, to gain recognition for movements.
In addition, instant communication and insignificant distance are afforded by the technological tools
that activists use, in order to make regimes visible, so regimes can no longer hide from the public and
their actions can be instantly taped and leaked (Thompson, 2005), like what happened with Khaled
Saeed, a young man killed by the police and his image stirred the public and later became a symbol for
the Egyptian revolution. Social media has turned the story of Khaled Saeed into an extremely “visible”
spectacle, which was marketed to stir grievances and encourage people to take action (Powell et al.,
2016), and the same applies to groups in this research. They used social media to make a spectacle of
the regime’s violations to transnational audience, by posting and translating victims’ testimonials on
social media, in an attempt to pressure the regime to stop such violations.
If activism is about framing a discourse and spreading knowledge about regime’s violations, the state
also tries to invalidate the activists’ account of violations online, so there is a clear struggle between
activists and the state over whose discourse is spread more on social media. Both sides use the same
tools to market their discourses. Moreover, as activists use violations as spectacles to call for people to
take action, the state also uses the visibility of certain spectacles to defame activists through traditional
or social media. For example, the state has leaked activists’ private footage online, and attacked
groups on traditional media, which are more widespread than social media, and this propaganda
caused activists to become at risk: “[the group] has been targeted recently and people even appeared
on TV attacking us. So there is that worry about, or that they find out who the admins are, and that we
end up being more directly in the line of fire…people started asking publicly who the admins of the
group are. That’s the main problem now, the security problem”.
Social media then becomes a space for overwhelming amount of contradictory narratives, and it becomes up to the audience to choose which side to believe, but in the end, the process of finding a credible discourse online by a neutral reader, who is not biased towards either side, becomes increasingly
difficult. With time, there is an increasing threat that the public starts believing state’s discourse over
activists’, because the state is able to systematically create a higher visibility for itself through propaganda on various online and traditional media channels. And even though activists try to create their
own alternative outlet for news or video archiving, these efforts cannot easily survive because activists
become emotionally exhausted from being targeted, and the volunteering model for groups does not
provide any funds to sustain the groups’ work. Because of emotional exhaustion and immense crackdown on activists, many of these groups are not currently operating anymore.
The full power and control over media and financial resources that the state has eventually affords it
with more visibility over activists. The state is then capable of purchasing its own visibility (Fuchs et
al., 2012), through mechanisms like the electronic committees. The situation can be viewed as “a
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dance between those who challenge authority, speak true to power, and hope for a more just world and
those who wish to extend their privilege and power” (Fernandez, 2008. p.171).

4.3

Visibility as Resignation versus Resistance

This paradox is a consequence of Brighenti’s visibility of control, where activists’ behaviour and internal reactions to the state’s surveillance are divided. There was a divide among activists’ opinions on
whether they should protect themselves from surveillance or resign to it, since they thought it requires
a lot of effort. Many of them paid much attention to surveillance in their lives and within their activist
groups. For example, some were extremely cautious, that they put their mobile phones completely outside of the room when they hold an important meeting, but others would simply not care to do the
same.
Consequently, there was a strong divide in how secret Facebook groups or mailing lists they use to
communicate within the group itself should be run. Some activists had a more careful approach and
thought that any new volunteers should not be added to these secret online groups unless other members can fully trust them, in case they were informers used by the state to monitor what the group was
planning. On the other hand, other activists thought they were not doing anything that they needed to
hide, and that “whoever wants to read or see what we are doing is more than welcome”. They thought
that paying attention to surveillance can be a “paranoid behaviour” that will distract them from the
actual cause they were working on, because it meant they cannot expand by adding new members,
despite being aware that they could be monitored by the state through untrusted personnel or surveillance equipment. But it was also part of some activists’ ideology that they should deal with the state
“as though you have nothing to hide, you behave as though your public work is in fact public, and you
only hide something to protect victims”.
While other activists did agree that they have nothing to hide, but still thought that they should resist
surveillance as much as they can, by not making their communication information available to be read
by untrusted people. One of the members who supported filtering their group from untrusted people
said that “maybe part of the bravery is being cautious, so that you are actually capable of achieving
what you want to achieve. I didn’t feel that that was cowardice, but they did…it’s not brave to be
thrown into prison when I can avoid it... Maybe it stems from that fact that I am very new to this, and
they have been activists for much longer”. Therefore, being an activist for many years can be one factor where a person resigns and becomes used to being visible to the public or the state.
Another factor that pushes activists to resign to being visible is the convenience of using user-friendly
platforms that everyone uses, like Facebook. Resisting surveillance meant the use of sophisticated
technical routines like Virtual Private Networks to mask the identity of groups’ Facebook pages’ administrators, encrypted instant messaging applications, and using complex passwords for activists’
personal accounts and devices. This way, activists attempt to shield some information from the state,
but still acknowledge that everything they do is exposed to the state, and that any technical attempts
are only to make it harder for the state to know information. Some of these attempts include using encrypted chat applications like Signal, which at a certain point in 2016 was blocked by authorities until
an update was issued for the application to bypass the blockage (Farid, 2016).
Even though many activists considered some platforms, like Facebook, unsafe in their opinions because their identity can be exposed through it or their accounts easily hacked, but still had to use it for
their group’s internal communications, because it was most convenient, user-friendly and had all people using it. An incident that forced an activist to take a more resistive approach to surveillance is
when her Facebook account as a group’s administrator was hacked, and the hacker instantly posted
pro-regime posts under her name, changed the name of the secret activism Facebook group to an insult, and also leaked private conversations from her inbox. The attacker also launched a Twitter attack
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to insult the activist and took control over her account, which forced her to take a more cautious approach towards surveillance by using protective technical measures and staying off social media for a
few weeks, because every time she tried to reclaim her accounts, the attacker tried to hack them again.
It was not clear who made the attack, but it created negative propaganda and much fear as a result of
surveillance and control.
The asymmetrical aspect of visibility is clear in activists not really knowing when or how much they
are being monitored. One group administrator mentioned, “I don’t continuously preoccupy myself
with that idea [of being watched all the time because of the group’s activity], but when something
happens I do think that [the group] is the cause. And I do constantly obsess over whether [the state]
know who the admins are and they are just letting us, or do they not know the admins yet”. Therefore,
there is a certain acceptance by some activists that they are visible to the state, as they resign to the
idea that they are going to work within this closely monitored space, without sophisticated technical or
personal measures for protection, because the nature of activism meant that activists have to go public
to present their cause. However, this visibility causes crackdown on activists, which makes them consider actively protecting and resisting the state measures, individually or collectively. But more importantly, the state of uncertainty about surveillance is stressful, as one activist mentioned that “the
mental stress of having to tolerate such an alert state all the time was quite tiresome on the members.”
It is probably why activists resign to being watched and start embracing it in their lives; the asymmetry in visibility is stressful to deal with.

5. Discussion
Visibility can be a choice for some actors, like activists, and this choice varies at different times and
political contexts. People choose to be visible when they perceive this as empowering to them or essential to their cause. This is why social movements inherently have to be visible in order to strengthen
themselves by enrolling their supporters and marketing their causes. It is a visibility of recognition that
such groups need to gain power and be noticed (Brighenti, 2010). As a result, the more visible a
movement is, the more cautious their counter-movements (like state authorities) are, in terms of violating people’s rights, but also, the more these counter-movements are using power and control to watch
and monitor their activist opponents.
Once the political context changes, and the counter-movements become more powerful, social movements start perceiving danger as they become more vulnerable, and less empowered. This causes a
divide among movements, and some actors want to continue being visible, to show that they will not
be intimidated by their opponents, but some will choose to be invisible, and protect themselves from
the potentially powerful crackdown. This creates different strategic modes of visibility: some actors
are visible all the time, while some actors choose to be visible at different stages by masking their
identities but push their whole movement to be visible instead. This way, social movements strategically manipulate visibility to their advantage by being selective in their modes of visibility according
to how they perceive, and decide to deal with, danger.
Nevertheless, the asymmetry in visibility puts actors under uncertainty because they are unable to predict the level to which they are being monitored; similar to Foucault’s prison inmates, since actors are
not fully aware or certain of being constantly visible. This asymmetry in visibility between activists
and the state is deepened due to different reasons. First, the advancement in technology allows expensive complex surveillance systems to be owned by authoritarian regimes, who are financially capable
of purchasing such systems, and also potentially hiring personnel to run online propaganda, so they
purchase visibility (Fuchs et al., 2012) and consequently, make themselves more visible to promote
their own discourse, while performing control by closely monitoring activists’ visibility. Second, not
all activists are technically knowledgeable about risks and security aspects of platforms, or able to use
complex protective means to mask their identities online, so they resign to being visible, and
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acknowledge that the state simply “knows everything”. Third, secure platforms for communication do
not provide the same capabilities that other more popular social media platforms provide, and most
users exist on these non-encrypted platforms, which ease communication among activists, but at the
same time risk the identity of activists, who want to hide themselves, if their accounts are hacked. This
can force activists to resign to visibility, unless a situation happens that makes them start resisting and
change their behaviour on online platforms to protect themselves. Fourth, the state, being in control of
the telecommunication infrastructure, has started blocking Virtual Private Networks (Egyptian
Streets, 2017), and other encrypted services (Farid, 2016), and therefore forcing all communication to
be visible and monitored, and leaving the less powerful activists struggling to know how far they are
being monitored. This is how asymmetry in visibility can cause stress to activists, causing them to become self-disciplined, by hiding their actions, or changing their behaviours, for example using complex technical methods and encrypted platforms for identity protection. This way, they are dealing
with the visibility of control, practiced through technology (Brighenti, 2010), by changing their modes
of visibility.
Therefore, the paradoxes of visibility show that it is not a case of one side being either always visible
or not, movements go through different modes and practices of visibility, and individuals in one
movement can also make different choices about their visibility. The choice to adopt a certain mode of
visibility is made according to factors like political context, level of crackdown, activism expertise,
and how much monitoring is perceived by individuals. Spectacles also go through the same process of
being strategically employed at certain times to achieve outcomes, as activists employ visibility of
specific spectacles to the advantage of their causes, while the state also uses activists’ personal spectacles to counter the discourse of activism.
Finally, this paper has shown that social media does not necessarily empower activists (Aouragh &
Alexander, 2011; Uldam, 2017), because the paradoxical effect of technology can result in contradictory implications (Arnold, 2003) for social movements. This also contributes to the criticism of social
media’s role in the Egyptian Revolution (Wilson & Dunn, 2011), and disciplinary surveillance (Fuchs,
2014), by unpacking the complexity of visibility as an affordance of social media and other ICTs, and
how visibility is enacted in complex social and political environments through power struggle, group
tension, individual choices and coping mechanisms.

6. Conclusion
This paper goes beyond the conceptualisation of visibility into three individual types, as set by
Brighenti (2010) to reinterpret the paradoxes under three types, in order to uncover the power struggle
of visibility between activists, who promote their causes and interact on social media on one side,
while the state on the other side, manipulates visibility to suppress digital activism, through monitoring and using the online space to market a counter-discourse. The paper proposes to reinterpret visibility into three paradoxes: empowerment versus vulnerability, discourse versus counter-discourse, and
resignation versus resistance. These paradoxes highlight the tension in the activism arena between activists and the state, and uncover the way activists deal with and respond to visibility. The limitations
of this study is that there is obviously no clear data from the state’s side on surveillance, regarding
what exactly is being performed and how. There are further implications of this research that can be
considered by the technical activist community, who can work on building new, and supporting the
existing, non-corporate non-state controlled platforms that bypass blocking in order to securely support activism.
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Appendix A

Person’s
acronym

Type

Groups
Position
affiliation

A1

In person

G6
G7

A2

In person

G3

Length

Date

Lawyer and activist 1 hr 21 mins
(G6 coordinator)

December 2016

Activist

1 hr 8 mins

December 2016

57 mins

December 2016

G6
G7
A3

In person

G6

Lawyer

A4

In person

G3

Lawyer and activist 1 hr 52 mins
(G6 coordinator)

December 2016

G6
G7
A5

In person

G3

Activist (G3 coordina- 1 hr 50 mins
tor)

December 2016

A6

In person

G2

Activist (G2, G5 coor- 43 mins
dinator)

December 2016

Lawyer

1 hr 33 mins

December 2016

Lawyer and activist

1 hr 27 mins

December 2016

G5
A7

In person

G3
G5
G6
G7

A8

In person

G3
G5
G6

A9

In person

G3

Activist

58 mins

December 2016

A10

In person

G2

Activist

1 hr 1 min

January 2017

A11

In person

G2

Activist

1 hr 7 mins

January 2017

A12

In person

G2

Lawyer (G5 coordina- 57 mins
tor)

January 2017

Activist (G7 coordina- 1 hr 26 mins
tor)

January 2017

G5
A13

In person

G6
G7

A14

In person

G2

Activist

1 hr 9 mins

January 2017

A15

In person

G2

Activist

54 mins

January 2017
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G7
A16

In person

G4

Activist

A17

In person

G2

Activist (G7 coordina- 1 hr
tor)

January 2017

Activist

1 hr 41 mins

January 2017

Activist (G8 coordina- 1 hr 14 mins
tor)

January 2017

G5

1 hr 9 mins

January 2017

G7
A18

In person

G3
G8

A19

In person

G6
G8

A20

In person

G7

G7 coordinator

1 hr 10 minutes

January 2017

A21

In person

G7

Activist and Lawyer

1 hr 11 mins

January 2017

A22

In person

G6

Activist and Lawyer

1 hr 8 mins

January 2017

A23

In person

G2

Activist (G2 coordina- 2 hr 16 mins
tor)

January 2017

Lawyer

January 2017

G8
A24

In person

G2

1 hr 7 mins

G5
A25

In person

G2
G5

A26

In person

G3
G5

Activist (G2 coordina- 1 hr 10 mins
tor)

January 2017

Activist and lawyer 1 hr 38 mins
(G8 coordinator)

January 2017

G6
G7
G8
A27

Online vid- G4
eo call

G4 coordinator

1 hr 54 mins

February 2017

A28

Online vid- G8
eo call

Activist

1 hr 5 mins

February 2017

A29

Online vid- G1
eo call

G1 coordinator

1 hr 51 mins

February 2017

1 hr 36 mins

March 2017

A30

Online vid- G1
G1 coordinator
eo call
Table 2: Interviewees' affiliations and interviews' durations
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